The disruption of terrorist plots in 2006 in the United Kingdom, Canada,
United States, and the July 2005 attacks in London as well as continue attack
in Pakistan land till 2000 to now 2012. This generates significant attention to
the concept of homegrown radicalization. But, this is the term which does not
define the real focus of concern-violent Islamic extremism. Before finding an
effective solution to this problem, law enforcement first must understand and
define it.
(1) What is Islamic extremism? Do radical beliefs always lead to terrorist
activity? The exploitation of religion by Islamic extremists to use violence
both overseas and at home is one of the gravest dangers facing the United
States. Al Qaeda represents the most pressing manifestation of this problem,
and the FBI still assesses attacks directed by core AL Qaeda leadership as the
primary terrorist threat to the United States. Al Qaeda's influence has
proliferated; its ideology and influence has spread beyond the Middle East and
South Asia. It now has subsidiaries in Iraq, North Africa, and Greater Syria.
(2) However, as the March 11, 2004, attacks in Madrid demonstrated, direct AL-Qaeda connections are not a precondition for successful Islamic terrorist
operations. The fact that every terrorist attack, even when al Qaeda does not
claim credit, creates a debate as to whether al Qaeda in some way directed the
operation signifies that al Qaeda has become a "brand" as much as an
organization. Public opinion surveys of Muslims in the Middle East and the West
suggest the difficulty of countering the message of violent extremists to those
inclined to hate the United States and the West for perceived oppression
against Muslims.
(3) A survey conducted in the United Kingdom in the spring of 2006 indicated
that a small but significant minority supported the July 2005 attacks there.
(4) It also revealed that a majority of Muslims in the Middle East still
believe that the 9/11 attacks were a Mossad plot.
(5) even after Usama Bin Ladin publicly claimed credit. More recent findings
have suggested that negative and suspicious attitudes toward the United States
persist.
(6) Because of this entrenched mind-set, support for violent Islamic
extremism will remain a continuous problem.
The speed with which radicalization to violence can occur and the increasing
youth of those drawn to the cause pose additional challenges. Both British and
Canadian authorities reported that people involved in the plotting in those countries
apparently had not previously been interested in religion but changed and
became willing to carry out terrorist operations within a year. In the summer
of 2006, the "Toronto 18" plot, a terrorist operation that sought to
bomb several prominent buildings in the Canadian cities of Toronto and Ottawa,
included five participants younger than 18. The timeframe needed to develop a
plot can be disturbingly short, and the tendency to dismiss youthful enthusiasm
as empty bravado may prove extremely dangerous.
Law enforcement leaders must be able to identify individuals with the most
potential to effect immediate harm, thereby controlling the operating
environment and designating time to address the larger issues underlying
violent Islamic extremism. Expressing dislike for the United States or lauding
Usama Bin Ladin does not make an individual a terrorist. Such an approach would
create a scenario simply too large to address effectively even without First
Amendment concerns about using these behaviors as indicators. But, law
enforcement agencies and intelligence services around the world wrestle with
the problem of predicting people's behavior. To address the threat that violent
extremists pose, the FBI developed a 2-pronged approach: first identify early
indicators of those who demonstrate the potential for violence and the second
one is engage in extensive outreach to Muslim communities to dispel
misconceptions that may foster extremism.
IDENTIFYING EARLY INDICATORS
Conversion to Islam is not radicalization. The FBI defines violent
extremists as persons who engage in, encourage, endorse, condone, justify, or
support in any way the commission of a violent act against either the U.S.
government, its citizens, or its allies to achieve political, social, or economic
changes or against others who may possess opinions contrary to their own
radicalized ideology.
The FBI assesses the radicalization process as four stages:
preradicalization, identification, indoctrination, and action. Each one is
distinct, and a radicalized individual may never reach the final stage.
Preradicalization
Conversion may be to a religion or a commitment to another form of the
religion. An individual's motivation is critical to the process and not always
static. For example, people who initially convert to gain acceptance may
reinterpret their faith if the group they join is composed of Muslim
extremists.
Motivation
In a jilted-believer conversion, internal frustration and dissatisfaction
with the current religious faith leads the individual to change belief systems.
The new system can be initially religious in tone or secular. Conversion
attempts to resolve inconsistencies between what the person has come to believe
and was taught to believe. For example, Adam Gadahn (aka Azzam the American), a
California native who converted to Islam and supports al Qaeda and Islamic
extremism, wrote in his conversion story that Jesus was, at best, the Son of
God and not someone who individuals should revere and pray to.
(7) A protest conversion may be an attempt by people to identify themselves
apart from or to rebel against a society or circumstances they perceive as
oppressive. Additionally, faith reinterpretation is another form of an
intrinsically driven conversion where individuals alter their religious tradition
through introspection and evaluation. This motivation refers specifically to
those born into Muslim families but choose to follow a more extremist form of
Islam, including such individuals as Faysal Galab, Tasein Taher, and Shafal
Mosed of the Lacka-wanna Six. Galab, Taher, and Mosed drank alcohol, used
drugs, and had relationships with non-Muslim women--all forbidden by the
Koran--before converting. After this transition, it was easier for Kamal
Derwish, who primarily influenced their newfound Islamic path, to convince them
to participate in jihad as a way of absolving their sins.
(8) Acceptance seeking, a form of extrinsic conversion, is a fundamental
human motivation.
(9) Individuals have a pervasive drive to form and maintain at least a
minimum quantity of lasting and significant interpersonal relationships.
(10) However, the product of these relationships can have positive or
negative consequences for the people involved. Those with weak social ties may
benefit from the solidarity that extremist groups provide.
Stimulus and Opportunity
Converts who proceed through the radicalization process often are driven by
a respected, frequently older, extremist with whom they have come into contact.
Kamal Derwish played a key role in the radicalization of the Lacka-wanna Six.
In the case of the Virginia Jihad Network, spiritual leader Ali Al-Timimi
convinced a group of individuals, including a technology expert from Pakistan,
a decorated Gulf War veteran and member of the National Rifle Association, a Korean
immigrant, a son of a Yemeni diplomat, and a Muslim who had converted from
Catholicism, to engage in violent jihad against U.S. troops. Interactions
between converts and Islamic extremists can occur in a variety of venues. For
example, in mosques, extremists can observe other Muslims' commitment to the
faith and their reactions to the Islamic message given by extremist religious
leaders. In prisons, extremist recruiters can identify a population disaffected
with society and use their operational skills and propensity for violence to
further their cause. In Islamic and secular universities, they can find curious
individuals who question society, as well as their own beliefs. Further,
extremists can interact with others in businesses, which provide a private
setting to conduct meetings and further indoctrinate new converts, and in
Internet chat rooms where vulnerable individuals from around the world can
gather to discuss Islamic doctrine.
Shaykh-ul-Islam Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri
Views about Extremism&Terrorism
Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri argues that terrorists have left the true,
classical teachings of Islam and that their rebellious spirit of violence and
religious extremism is a continuity of the Khawarij. Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri
was one of the religious leaders in Pakistan to condemn the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001. He has denounced and severely condemned Osama bin Laden.
Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri describes terrorism as an "ideological
infection" and believes that, through his anti-terrorism summer camps,
"we are fighting on the ideological, philosophical, theological and
academic fronts. We are trying to educate young people.
Reuters featured Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri in August 2009 as a leading Sufi
scholar who is working to bring the western youth away from extremism towards
moderate Islam and to combat extreme tendencies.
After the December 2009 Rawalpindi attack he was quoted as saying:
"Suicide attacks are not allowed in Islam, these actions are un-Islamic,
the slaughter of human beings in any religion or country, and terrorism in all
its manifestations, are totally in contradiction with the teachings of
Islam." The same view is also held by the majority of mainstream
(non-Sufi) Muslims based on the teachings of the Quran.
